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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Utilisant l'indice de queue de distribution (index tail) des rendements financiers sur actions dans 
les marchés américains comme mesure sommaire des comportements extrêmes, nous examinons 
les changements dans le marché des actions entourant le développement de programmes 
automatiques de transaction (Trading Program) pour l'assurance de portefeuille, le krach de 
1987, l'introduction des coupe-circuits et autres changements dans les systèmes financiers. De 
nouveaux tests, récemment développés, permettent l'inférence statistique sur le changement des 
comportements extrêmes sur une longue période ; tests qui sont valides dans le cas 
d'hétéroscédasticité conditionnelle. L'hypothèse nulle est que l'indice de queue de distribution est 
constant alors que  l'hypothèse alternative est le changement de cet indice à une date inconnue. 
Nous avons trouvé de manière très significative que d'une part, l'indice de queue de distribution a 
diminué (la probabilité d'évènements extrêmes a augmenté) au début de la période des 
programmes de transactions. D’autre part, l'introduction de coupe-circuits a augmenté cet indice 
mais est resté plus faible que sa valeur avant l'introduction des programmes de transactions. Les 
estimateurs de l'indice de queue de distribution suggèrent qu'il n'a pas retrouvé sa valeur initiale. 
 
Using the tail index of returns on US equities as a summary measure of extreme behaviour, we 
examine changes in the equity markets surrounding the development of program trading for 
portfolio insurance, the crash of 1987, and the subsequent introduction of circuit breakers and 
other changes in market architecture.  Recently-developed tests for the null of constancy of the 
tail index, versus the alternative of a change at an unknown date, permit inference on changes in 
extreme behaviour over a long time period while allowing for second-moment dependence in the 
return data.  We find strong evidence of a decrease in the tail index (increase in the probability 
of extreme events) around the beginning of large scale program trading, and weaker, but still 
substantial, evidence of further significant change in the tail index following the introduction of 
circuit breakers.  Point estimates of the tail index suggest that the tail index has nonetheless not 
regained pre-program-trading levels. 
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1. Introduction
After the equity market crash of October 1987, a number of changes were
made to markets’ operating procedures in order to limit the program trading which
was widely blamed for the crash. In particular, ‘circuit breakers’ were introduced
whereby, following drops of specied size, trading is temporarily halted or restricted.
One interpretation of the intent behind these restrictions is that they were designed
to return the equity markets’ behaviour in extreme circumstances to roughly the
state prevailing before the introduction of program trading. That is, equity markets
have always exhibited occasional extreme events, but program trading was perceived
to have altered the extreme behaviour of markets from the state prevailing when
investors’ judgments alone governed trades. Circuit breakers and other regulatory
changes might be viewed as an attempt to return to this pre-existing state.1
In this paper we investigate the empirical facts lying behind this interpretation
of events, using formal statistical tests to detect changes in the behaviour of ex-
tremes of equity market returns. In particular, we address these two questions: (i)
did the period following the introduction of program trading show a genuine change
in the character of extreme return events? If so, (ii) did the introduction of market
reforms lead to a further discernible break in tail behaviour, returning the markets
to a state similar to that prevailing before the introduction of program trading?
To address these questions we use the tail index of the density of equity returns,
on both the Dow Jones Industrial and the S&P 500 indices. With the tail index
as our measure of extreme behaviour in returns, our questions can be formulated
somewhat more precisely as follows: did the period of program trading represent
a structural break in the tail index of equity market returns? If so, did market
reforms lead to a further signicant break, returning the tail index approximately
to its pre-existing value?
There have been several previous empirical studies of the eects of circuit
breakers, including those of Ma, Rao and Sears (1989a,b), Santoni and Liu (1993),
and Booth and Broussard (1998), using data from US bond and commodity markets
and the NYSE respectively. The Ma et al. and Santoni and Liu studies examine the
impact of circuit breakers on market volatility, using in the former cases measures of
volatility based on daily closing prices or cumulative average returns in one-minute
interval data, and in the latter ARCH models of the daily conditional volatility.
These results are mixed, with the Ma et al. studies of bond and commodity markets
suggesting lower volatility after the introduction of trading restrictions, whereas
Santoni and Liu nd little evidence for a reduction in conditional volatility in S&P
500 index data. Booth and Broussard, in common with the present paper, study
1An alternative interpretation, of course, is that the changes were introduced with
the aim of enforcing some optimal degree of extreme behaviour.
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tail properties of NYSE index data, and present detailed evidence on the evolving
size of the circuit breaker triggers as a proportion of the index value. We will refer
further to these results below.
Studies on equity markets outside the U.S. include those of Roll (1989), Bertero
and Mayer (1990) and Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993). Lauterbach and Ben-Zion
examine the period of the 1987 crash on the Tel Aviv market, for which circuit
breaker mechanisms were in place in 1987, and for which order imbalance data
are also available. These authors suggest that trading restrictions did not aect the
overall degree of decline, but did smooth returns around the crash date. Roll (1989)
and Bertero and Mayer (1990) each compare 23 stock markets around the time of
the crash, in monthly and daily data respectively; the latter study nds a substantial
impact of circuit breakers on price declines, while the former does not. Nonetheless,
as Lauterbach and Ben-Zion point out, trading restrictions dier substantially across
international markets, making the results of such exercises dicult to interpret.
The present study is able to provide substantial further evidence on the eects
of circuit breakers, for several reasons. First, by concentrating on overall charac-
terization of the tail of the return distribution rather than on volatility measures,
our results are focused on extreme events; we are able to examine the evolution of
this measure of extreme behaviour over time. Recent work on tests for a structural
break in the tail index at an unknown date (Quintos et al. 2001) and on tail in-
dex estimation with dependent sequences (Hsing 1991) allows us to test for such
changes in data such as equity returns which display (second moment) dependence.
The Quintos et al. tests, because they do not require a priori specication of a
break point, permit examination of the period of gradual emergence of program
trading as an important feature of US equity markets, as well as the period after
which circuit breakers were introduced. These tests use Hsing’s results to allow for
the dependence present in such data.
A second element in our additional evidence is the time series of post-circuit-
breaker daily returns in US stock markets. Because tail index estimation is usually
based only on data from the tails of the empirical density, very large samples are
typically required in order to obtain reliable estimates. Nonetheless, with over a
dozen years of post-reform data, it is now possible to obtain reasonable tail index
estimates for this period. With a time series of daily index returns extending back to
1928 (Dow Jones Industrial Average), and 1950 (S&P 500), we are able to estimate
and test for changes in the tail index both in long samples and in shorter samples
dating from the introduction of large-scale program trading.
The next section of the paper describes the regulatory changes in US equity
markets over the period of interest, and the data used in testing. Section 3 explains
the statistical methods used for tail index estimation and testing for changes in this
index; Section 4 presents the results of the estimation and inferential procedures,
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and interprets the evidence.
2. Data and market structure
This study examines the two longest-standing indices of U.S. equity prices, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average and the broader S&P 500 Index. Because the struc-
ture of circuit breakers is based on daily stock price changes{that is, the measure
of price change which these devices use is implicitly set to zero at the beginning of
each trading day{we examine daily changes in these index levels. Daily information
is available for a long historical period for the Dow Jones index; we use data from
October 1 1928, the date at which the index took its current 30-stock form. Our
daily sample of the S&P 500 begins on January 3 1950; both series end in March of
2002, for total sample sizes of 18443 days (DJIA) and 13129 days (S&P). Each of
these data series is transformed to daily logarithmic returns, rt = ln( ptpt−1 ); where
pt is the index value at time t; reducing sample sizes by 1.
Post-1987 changes in the structure and regulation of these markets have been
thoroughly described in the literature; see in particular Lindsey and Pecora (1998).
We will conne ourselves here to a brief review of some elements that are especially
important for our present purposes.
The rst ‘circuit breakers’, introduced in October 1998, required a trading halt
of one hour following a fall in the DJIA of 250 points from the previous day’s close,
and of two additional hours if in subsequent trading the total decline reached 400
points. In July of 1996, the durations of these required trading halts were reduced
to 30 minutes and one hour respectively, and in January 1997 the trigger points
were changed (reflecting in part the increase in value of the DJIA which had made
the previous triggers smaller percentages of the index value), to 350 and 550 points.
Additional restrictions govern entering of index arbitrage trades when the DJIA
either advances or declines 50 points from the previous close, and govern market
orders involving program trading when the S&P 500 futures contract falls 12 points
below the previous day’s close (Lindsey and Pecora 1998).
Booth and Broussard (1998) document the decline in the initial 250-point trig-
ger as a percentage of the DJIA from approximately 12 percent at its introduction
to less than half of this percentage near the end of 1995. It is clear, then, that the
degree to which these triggers have constrained trading changed substantially over
time; Booth and Brousard estimate the probabilities of declines exceeding the trig-
ger values, and note substantial corresponding changes over time in these estimated
probabilities.
The period in which program trading, particularly for purposes of portfolio
insurance, became important in U.S. equity markets cannot be dated as precisely
as can regulatory changes.2 Nonetheless, this period is of interest insofar as we are
2Program trading for portfolio insurance, as opposed to arbitrage, is particularly
3
interested in the question of whether circuit breakers and other regulatory changes
can be viewed as having returned the markets to some state prevailing before the
era of program trading. An indication of the point at which program trading for
portfolio insurance became an important element in markets will govern our selec-
tion below of a sub-sample for post-program-trading tests; based on the value of
securities protected by such portfolio insurance, we have chosen 2 January 1985 as
the beginning of this sample from the period of signicant program trading.
In the next section, we turn to the tail index with which we will characterize the
extremes of the return distribution through these historical periods, and describe
the methods by which we will estimate the value of the tail index and test for
changes over time.
3. Statistical methods
The tail index characterizes the rate at which probability mass falls away in
the tail of a distribution; a relatively high tail index corresponds with relatively low
probability of extreme events. Let fXig be a sequence of random variables with
common distribution function F (x); so that 1−F (x) is the probability of observing
a value exceeding x: Then (see, for example, Hsing 1991) 1 − F (x) is said to be
regularly varying at 1 if there exists  > 0 such that
(1− F (hx))=(1− F (x)) ! h−α as x !1; 8h > 0: (3:1)
We refer to  as the tail index parameter, and note that (1) implies
(1− F (x))! kx−α as x !1; for some k > 0: (3:2)
While a number of estimators of  are available, we will use that of Hill (1975),
for several reasons: the estimation procedure does not depend on existence of the
fourth moment of the data; the estimator has been found to perform relatively
well on sample sizes available in nancial data (Kearns and Pagan 1997); and,
particularly importantly for our present purpose, it is the basis of the structural
break tests of Quintos et al. (2001). Other methods have been proposed to reduce
bias in such estimates, in particular the ML method of Feuerverger and Hall (1999),
which treats the tails as approximated by a mixture of Pareto densities such that
(adapting to the present case of a tail at innity rather than at the origin), 1−F (x) =
k1x
−α(1 + k2x−β + o(x−β)) is explicitly used as a model, leading to estimates of
both  and : Note that this model is compatible with (3.1) as x ! 1: However,
important here because of the potential for large scale sales of securities triggered
by an initial market decline.
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our interest here is not in the absolute level of the tail index, but in possible changes
over time; the methods of inference concerning structural change are therefore our
primary concern.
Hill’s estimator is based on the m largest order statistics of the sample. Follow-
ing the notation of Quintos et al., dene the order statistics from the original sample
fX1;X2; : : : XT g as fXT(1);XT(2); : : : XT(T )g; XT(1)  XT(2)  : : :  XT(T ): Choose the
largest mT of these, XT(T−mt+1) to X
T
(T ); for estimation on the right tail of the distri-
bution (for the left tail, multiply the smallest mT values by -1). The Hill estimator
of  is then
^T =
[
m−1T
mT∑
i=1
lnXT(T−i+1) − lnXT(T−mT +1)
]−1
: (3:3)
Estimation of the tail index parameter generally requires a relatively large
sample, because only a small proportion of the sample occurs, by denition, in the
tails; it is common in estimation to use a proportion such as 10% of the sample size,
following DuMouchel (1983) who suggest mT be a xed proportion not exceeding
0:1T: All sequences of tail index estimates in the present paper are based on the
Hill estimator, and vary only in the denition of the sample used for estimation.
In recursive estimation, a sequence of estimators is presented in which the sample
size is augmented at each date by the latest data point; in rolling estimation, a
xed sample size is maintained by dropping the earliest data point each time a new
data point is added. Our estimates are updated daily and are presented graphically
below.
The structural change tests of Quintos et al. (2001) are based on these se-
quences of tail index estimates. The null hypothesis is that the tail index has the
constant value  over the real interval t 2 [t0; T − t0]; with alternative of departure
from  at some point in the interval, and is tested with sequences of estimates
dened over dierent sets of samples. Recursive estimates produce a sequence of
estimates ^t using samples 1; : : : t; for t = t0; t0 +1; : : : T − t0; rolling estimates use
samples 1+(t− t0); : : : t; with t indexed over the same values, for a constant sample
size t0: The sequential tests use both a recursive set of estimates and a reverse re-
cursive set,3 labelled ^(−)t ; dened over samples 1; : : : t and t + 1; : : : T respectively,
where once again t indexes the values t0; t0 + 1; : : : T − t0: The sequences of test
3Recall that the reverse recursive estimator begins with an estimate on the maxi-
mum sample, here t0 + 1; : : : T; and drops a point from the beginning of the sample
to produce each new estimate in the sequence.
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statistics are (in a slightly modied notation):
Z1(t) =
(
tmt
T
)(
^t
^T
− 1
)2
Z2(t) =
(
t0m0
T
)(
^(t0,t)
^T
− 1
)2
Z3(t) =
(
tmt
T
)(
^t
^
(−)
t
− 1
)2
;
(3:4)
where ^(t0,t) is the tail index estimate on the rolling sample of size t0 and m0 is the
corresponding number of order statistics.
The test statistics are supt Zi(t); i = 1; 2; 3; and in the IID case have asymptotic
distributions obtained and tabulated by Quintos et al.
For the present problem, there are several additional points to be considered.
First, the recursive test is consistent only against increases in tail thickness (decrease
in ) beyond the breakpoint, a consequence of the fact that a part of the sample
with thick tails dominates in estimation of : For this reason, although the recur-
sive method is the standard approach to structural change tests in many contexts,
the recursive tests will not allow us to examine potentially signicant decreases in
tail thickness following market reforms. We will therefore not rely on these tests,
although we will mention their results below for the part of our problem to which
they are applicable.
Second, the nancial returns data that we examine here are not IID, but display
second-moment dependence often modelled, for example, with GARCH processes.
Quintos et al. provide modied versions of the test statistics using the results of
Hsing (1991) for dependent processes, applying these to the squares of the logarith-
mic returns. The modications are based on a re-scaling of each of the equations of
(3.4) to account for the dierent variance of the Hill estimates when the raw data
are serially dependent; with the appropriate re-scaling the same asymptotic distri-
bution holds. These are the versions of the (rolling and sequential) tests that we
employ below. If fXig has tail index ; then fX2i g has tail index =2; in the gures
below we rescale the estimated tail index parameters by 2 to report the estimated
tail index for the original series of logarithmic returns.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Evolution of the tail index on the full samples
The rst set of empirical results concerns the hypothesis of constancy of the
tail index on the full historical samples. The results, for rolling tests using various
sample proportions and for the sequential tests, are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1
Full-sample rolling and sequential tests
DJIA and S&P 500 index log returns
DJIA S&P 500
Test 1% c.v. sup(Zi(t)) sup(Zi(t))
Rolling, γ = 0:15 1.90 13.9 3.12
Rolling, γ = 0:20 2.30 22.5 4.30
Rolling, γ = 0:25 2.55 27.6 5.29
Rolling, γ = 0:30 2.86 39.3 6.71
Sequential, t0 = 500 28.82 332.6 151.6
These results are easily summarized. On all tests and on both equity price
indices, the null of constancy of the tail index is rejected at a test level of 0.01
(the smallest tabulated); that is, each of the test statistics exceeds (by a substantial
margin) the 99th percentile of the null distribution.4 The dates at which the maxima
of the statistics occur are in general in the year preceding the 1987 crash; the
pointwise statistics are in most cases above the 1% critical values for many dates in
the neighbourhood of that time. For the Dow Jones Industrials data, the months
in which the maximum statistics in the rolling tests occur vary from April 1986
(γ = 0:15) to October 1987 (γ = 0:20); in the sequential test, the maximum occurs
in September 1998. In the S&P data, the maxima occur between August 1982
(γ = 0:15) and October/December 1987 (γ = 0:25; 0:30); note however from Figure
1e that the early peak is isolated and only slightly exceeds the statistics from 1987.
The sequential test again shows a late maximum in October 1998.5 All of these dates
should be interpreted very cautiously, in part because the alternative hypothesis of
a break at a particular date is not something that we wish to interpret literally
4As we noted above, we will not use the recursive test because of the lack of con-
sistency against an increase in the tail index (decrease in tail thickness) over the
sample. However, we note that the recursive statistics corresponding to those in
Table 1 also show strong rejections of the null of constant  on the full samples,
and that these tests are consistent against a substantial decrease in the tail index,
as appears to have occurred in the neighbourhood of 1987.
5Recall that the sequential tests compare samples before and after a hypothesized
break date, whereas rolling and recursive tests use data up to the particular date.
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for the present problem. Moreover we note from Quintos et al. (1991, esp. Table
3) that estimates of breakpoints may be quite poor, and even in favourable cases
show substantial variability around the true date. Nonetheless, we do note that the
strongest evidence of statistically signicant change in the tail index does tend to
occur in the period of interest.
The sequences of rolling statistics for a variety of sample proportions are pre-
sented in Figure 1 (a{d: DJIA; e{h: S&P). Figure 2, which we will discuss in more
detail below, clearly indicates that the change in the tail index around 1987 which
is identied by the tests is in the direction of a fall in ; that is, an increase in tail
thickness and therefore in the relative frequency of extreme events.
4.2 The tail index in the era of program trading and circuit breakers
The next set of results concerns inference on the post-program-trading era for
which, as described above, we use data from 2 January 1985. We are now interested
in particular in the possibility that the tail index may have increased (tail thickness
decreased) later in the sample, as circuit breakers were introduced. Since the rst
circuit breakers took eect in October of 1988, we have an initial sample of almost
one thousand trading days on which to base pre-circuit-breaker estimates. Recall,
however, that the severity with which these regulations bind has changed over time
as the trigger points as a percentage of index value changed; there is therefore no
xed degree of severity of these circuit breakers, and no xed date at which the
process may be deemed to have changed from one xed regime to another xed
regime. Nonetheless, we are able to test the null of constancy of the tail index.
We examine the possibility of a signicant change in  in this later sample of
data using the rolling and sequential tests which are consistent for a change in  in
the direction described by this alternative hypothesis, i.e. to the extent that circuit
breakers are successful in limiting extreme fluctuations, the implied change in  is
positive (a decrease in tail thickness/frequency of extreme events). The results of
the tests on the post-program-trading sub-sample, for which sample sizes are now
identical in the DJIA and S&P 500 index data, are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2
Sub-sample rolling and sequential tests
DJIA and S&P 500 index log returns
DJIA S&P 500
Test 1% c.v. sup(Zi(t)) sup(Zi(t))
Rolling, γ = 0:15 1.90 2.13 2.18
Rolling, γ = 0:20 2.30 2.48 3.56
Rolling, γ = 0:25 2.55 2.16 1.79
Rolling, γ = 0:30 2.86 4.61 1.90
Sequential, t0 = 500 28.82 32.4 35.1
While evidence is weaker on this pair of smaller samples, there is still substantial
evidence against the null of constancy of the tail index; both sequential statistics and
ve of the eight rolling statistics have p-values below 0.01, and the remaining three
rolling tests are in the upper 10% of the null distribution. As an aid to interpreting
these results, consider again Figure 2a-d; note that we have recorded the recursive
estimates only for the smaller rolling sample proportions (γ = 0:15; 0:20), since as
this proportion increases results from the latter part of the sample are blurred by
the inclusion of more data from earlier periods. All four test statistics from these
shorter spans reject the null of constancy at 1%.
In each of the four individual gures, a clear jump in the estimated tail index
is visible in the latter part of the sample (as γ is larger, this jump is later, reflecting
the fact that a given data point remains in the rolling sample for more periods).
After this increase, the estimates of  tend to remain lower (frequency of extreme
events higher) than the values attained in, for example, the 1960-1980 period. That
is, these estimates suggest that the eect of the post-1987 reforms has been to raise
the tail index, and the statistics in Table 2 are compatible with the signicance of
this eect. However, the estimates suggest that the eect of the reforms has not
been so large as to return the tail index to levels prevailing before the era of program
trading. We note however that the last conclusion is based on the point estimates
alone, and is not supported by statistical inference on the relative magnitudes.
5. Concluding remarks
A sequence of changes, both technological and regulatory, took place in US
equity markets from the mid-1980’s. A rst goal of this paper is to consider whether
corresponding changes can be observed in the pattern of extreme events in the equity
9
markets, as summarized here by the tail index of the distribution of logarithmic
returns, or whether by contrast the nature of the tail of the return distribution was
approximately stable over this time period. The statistical evidence is very clear
on this question, indicating very strong rejections of the hypothesis of constant tail
behaviour. The datings of signicant statistics in the sequence are compatible with
the importance of the historical changes in market operation related to program
trading. We conclude then that the markets began to display signicantly more
extreme behaviour at approximately this time.
The second question of interest is that of whether we can detect attentuating
influences on extreme behaviour during the period of regulatory reform which fol-
lowed the 1987 crash. On this point the evidence is less strong; nonetheless there
is substantial evidence of further change in the pattern of extreme events, in the
direction of a reduction in the frequency of extreme changes. However, the evidence
tends to suggest that the frequency of extreme events remains higher than in, for
example, the 1960-80 period.
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